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Landlord-Tenant Legislation: Revising an
Old Common Law Relationship
Pursuant to the California Law Revision Commission's recom-
nendations, legislation was introduced which would require the
landlord to mitigate damages arising when the tenant abandons
or is justifiably evicted from the leasehold. The author traces the
development of landlord-tenant law from early common law to re-
cent enactments. In analyzing the recent legislation he attempts
to indicate the practical eHect of the changes made as well as
point out the merits and possible deficiencies which may be en-
countered.
In California, pursuant to an 1872 enactment by the legislature, the
Civil Code specifies that a lease is a contract.1 The courts, however,
have refused to acknowledge this position. Rather, they have adopted
the majority position that a lease has a duel identity. For exam-
ple, in 1942 the California Supreme Court referred to a lease as both a
contract and a conveyance when it stated:
While it is true that a lease is primarily a conveyance (emphasis
added) in that it transfers an estate to the lessee, it also presents the
aspect of contract. . . . This dual character serves to create two
distinct sets of rights and obligations--'one comprising those grow-
ing out of the relation of landlord and tenant, and said to be
based on the 'privity of estate', and the other comprising those
growing out of the express stipulations of the lease, and so said to
be based on 'privity of contract.' 2
Serious problems have developed due to the fact that property law
concepts have become hopelessly entwined and confused with contract
law theories.
In an attempt to alleviate this problem, the California Legislature,
in 1970, enacted legislation which adds to, and amends current sec-
tions of the California Civil Code.3 This legislation, which will
1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1925: "Hiring is a contract by which one gives to another
the temporary possession and use of property, other than money for reward, and the
latter agrees to return the same to the former at a future time."
2 Medico-Dental, Etc., Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 418 (1942).
See also Samuels v. Ottinger, 169 Cal. 209, 211 (1915).
3 A.B. 171, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 89.
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become operative on July 1, 1971, provides that contract principles will
apply to leases when (1) a tenant breaches his lease and abandons the
property before the end of the term, or (2) his right to possession is
terminated by the landlord due to a breach of the lease.4
To fully appreciate the changes made in the law by this new legisla-
tion, it is necessary to examine more completely the present status
of the law and its development from the early common law.
Surrender at Common Law
The common law provided that the tenant was the title holder
for the duration of the lease, because a lease was considered a convey-
ance of an estate in real property. The tenant did not have a mere
contractual right to the use of the property; instead he held title and
had the absolute right to the use of the property until the lease
terminated.5 Termination was usually accomplished by natural expira-
tion; i.e., the lease ended automatically on the day. specified in the
lease."
Infrequently, leasehold estates were also terminated by surrender-
the voluntary or involuntary relinquishment of the possessory estate to
the owner of the reversion or the remainder.7  Voluntary surrender,
which arose from a mutual agreement between the parties to terminate
the lease, was the rarest of the two types of surrender" because the
effect was to extinguish all enforceable duties, including the tenant's
duty to make any further rent payments.'
Involuntary surrender (surrender by operation of law) was the more
prominent type of surrender. It occurred when the tenant abandoned
the leasehold and the landlord subsequently took possession of the
premises for his own benefit.' 0
In Welcome v. Hess, the California court stated:
The term is an estate in lands. The tenant, subject to the cove-
nants of his lease, is the owner for the term. If he leaves the
demised premises vacant, and avows his intention not to be bound
by his lease, his title still continues, unless the landlord has ac-
4 Id.
5 Harvey, A Study to Determine Whether the Rights and Duties Attendant
Upon the Termination of a Lease Should be Revised, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1141, 1143
(1966).
6 Id.
7 B RBY, REAL. PROPERTY §§ 82, 83, at 181-187 (3d ed. 1965).
8 Kreling v. Walsh, 77 Cal. App. 2d 821, 832 (1947); Steel v. Thompson, 59
Cal. App. 191, 192 (1922).
9 3 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1505 (1940).
10 2 WrrKiN, SUMMARY OF CAIFORNA LAW, Real Property § 280 (7th ed. 1960).
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cepted the offer of surrender. The landlord has no more right to
the possession or to lease than a stranger. Admit that he may
take such care of the property as will prevent waste, still he must
not interfere with the right of the tenant to the absolute dominion
and control. If he does so interfere, it is an eviction, and the
tenant will be released."
Such a surrender by operation of law is valid even though oral. The
statute of frauds is not applicable because the surrender is a result of
an estoppel, not a reconveyance. The landlord is estopped from deny-
ing his acceptance of the surrender due to his conduct-that of taking
unqualified possession of the leasehold for his own benefit.12
Abandonment by Tenant-Present Law
When the tenant abandons the leasehold, under the present law, the
landlord has three remedies from which to choose, 13 assuming the lease
contains no accelerated damages provision. 4 First, the landlord may
leave the premises unoccupied; the lease would remain in existence
and he could sue for each installment of rent as it became due.' 5 The
rationale behind this remedy is that the tenant is the owner of the
property and no collection can be made for future rent until it falls
due.'" This concept is based on the common law principle that rent
did not accrue from day to day, but only became due on the day fixed
for payment in the lease.' 7 Consequently, the landlord was forced to
bring a series of actions in order to be fully compensated for his dam-
ages. Unfortunately, the landlord was without assurance that he would
ever be able to collect the rent as it becomes due since the tenant may
not be solvent at a later date or he may leave the jurisdiction of the
court. In California, where title is in the tenant for the duration of
the lease, the courts do not apply the theory of anticipatory breach of
11 Welcome v. Hess, 90 Cal. 507 (1891).
12 Id. at 513.
13 Treff v. Gulko, 214 Cal. 591, 598 (1932); Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware
& Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 671 (1944). See also Comment, The California Lease-
Contract or Conveyance? 4 STAN. L. REv. 244 (1952). Further, for a comprehensive
analysis of current California law in the area of termination of a lease see Harvey, A
Study to Determine Whether the Rights and Duties Attendant Upon the Termination of
a Lease Should be Revised, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1141 (1966).
14 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3308 states:
The parties to any lease of real or personal property may agree therein that if
such lease shall be terminated by the lessor by reason of any breach thereof
by the lessee; the lessor shall thereupon be entitled to recover from the
lessee the worth at the time of such termination, of the excess, if any of the
amount of rent and charges equivalent to rent reserved in the lease for the
balance of the stated term, or any shorter period of time over the then
reasonable rental value of the premises for the same period.
15 Treff v. Gulko, 214 Cal. 591, 598 (1932); Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware
& Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 671 (1944).
10 Phillips-Hollman, Inc., v. Peerless Stages, Inc., 210 Cal. 253, 258 (1930).
17 Silveira v. Ohm, 33 Cal. 2d 272, 275 (1949).
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contract to lease agreements.' 8
Under the second alternative, as espoused in Treff v. Gulko, the
landlord has the option of repossessing the leasehold and treating the
lease as terminated.' 9 This amounts to a surrender by operation of law
because the act of repossessing for the landlord's benefit, coupled with
his dominion and control over the demised premises, is inconsistent
with the tenant's property right.2" The landlord is not entitled to any
rent or damages other than those rents accumulated prior to the date of
repossession by him.2' Obviously, if the landlord immediately rents
to a new tenant for the remainder of the term and for the same
amount of rent as the terminated lease, he is not damaged and this
remedy is satisfactory.
Under a third remedy the landlord may assert his right by re-en-
tering the premises, taking possession, and reletting for the benefit of
the tenant who has vacated the leasehold. 2 He may also "hold the
.e tenant for damages for the difference between the rentals provided for
in the lease and what in good faith he was able to procure from a re-
letting. '23 In order to take advantage of this remedy and avoid a sur-
render by operation of law, the landlord must notify the tenant that he
is taking possession of the leasehold and reletting for the tenant's
benefit.2' This notification is necessary due to the fact that although
the tenant has abandoned the leasehold, his title continues for the
term set forth in the lease unless the landlord accepts the surrender.21
Presently, the California courts refuse to award damages until the
end of the lease even when there has been a reletting 20 (in the absence
of a clause in the lease pursuant to Civil Code section 3308).27
Is 2 WrrmIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 283 (7th ed. 1960).
19 Treff v. Gulko, 214 Cal. 591, 598 (1932); Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware& Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 671 (1944).
20 Dorich v. Time Oil Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 677, 688 (1951).
21 3 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 1505 (1940).
22 Treff v. Gulko, 214 Cal. 591, 598 (1932); Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware
& Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 671 (1944).
23 Treff v. Gulko, 214 Cal. 591, 598 (1932).
24 Dorich v. Time Oil Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 677, 684 (1951). See also
Rehkopf v. Wirz, 31 Cal. App. 695, 696 (1916), where it is stated:
Where a tenant abandons the leased property and repudiates the lease, the
landlord may accept possession of the property for the benefit of the tenant
and relet the same, and thereupon may maintain an action for damages for
the difference between what he was able in good faith to let the property for
and the amount provided to be paid under the lease agreement. . . . But a
lessor who chooses to follow that course must in some manner give the lessee
information that he is accepting such possession for the benefit of the tenant
and not in his own right and for his own benefit. If the lessor takes posses-
sion of property delivered to him by his tenant and does so unqualifiedly, he
thereby releases his tenant.
25 Dorich v. Time Oil Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 677, 684 (1951).
26 Treff v. Gulko, 214 Cal. 591, 593 (1932); Phillips-Hollman, Inc. v. Peerless
Stages, 210 Cal. 253, 258 (1930).
27 See note 14 supra.
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This is because they consider liability for damages as single and entire,
not multiple and several.28  Therefore, any damages are determined as
of the termination date of the original lease.29 Currently, there appears
to be little justification for this approach. Since the landlord has re-
let the demised premises, damages are ascertainable-the difference
between the rentals in the two agreements. The landlord is not going
to be unjustly enriched if he is permitted to collect all future damages
at the time of judgment. He is merely realizing the benefit of his bar-
gain with the breaching tenant, a monetary sum equivalent to the
amount the landlord would have received had the tenant not breached
the lease. By allowing the landlord to obtain the benefit of his bar-
gain at the time of judgment, the necessity of resorting to a multiplicity
of suits, and the possibility that the tenant will no longer be solvent or
subject to the court's jurisdiction is eliminated.
One possible exception to the argument that damages would be com-
pletely ascertainable might be the situation where the landlord relets
for a period less than the balance of the remaining term of the
breached lease. However, there is a statutory exception to this result
,on damages that should be noted. The landlord may sue immedi-
ately for all damages, present and future, if an accelerated damages
provision is included in the lease pursuant to Civil Code section 3308.30
Eviction of the Tenant-Present Law
When the tenant commits a breach that is sufficiently material to
justify termination of the lease, the landlord once more has three reme-
dies. First, he may consider the breach to be partial. The landlord is
not required to terminate the lease, but rather, he may continue it and
sue for all damages caused.3' However, election of this remedy places
the landlord in a position of dealing with a tenant who has proven
himself unreliable.
Second, the landlord may terminate the lease and evict the tenant; 2
however, eviction results in a cessation of further rent,33 because the
lease is terminated. Thus the remedy of eviction is inadequate for
the same reason as in abandonment cases; the landlord is damaged and
is without redress for his losses. An exception is the situation where
28 Treff v. Gulko, 214 Cal. 591, 593 (1932); citing with approval the New York
case of Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248 N.Y. 333 (1928).
29 Treff v. Gulko, 214 Cal. 591, 593 (1932); Phiflips-Hollman Inc. v. Peerless
Stages, 210 Cal. 253, 258 (1930).30 See note 14 supra.
3' Bank of America Etc. Assn. v. Moore, 18 Cal. App. 2d 522, 526, 528 (1937).
32 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 1161, 1174.
33 Costell v. Martin Brothers, 74 Cal. App. 782, 786 (1925).
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the landlord can immediately rent to a new tenant at a higher rental in
which case it would be advantageous to evict the original tenant.
Finally, in certain instances, the landlord may evict the tenant with-
out terminating the lease. 34  Section 1174 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure35 provides that there is no termination of the lease unless the
notice required for an action of unlawful detainer" specifies that the
landlord is terminating the lease. Further, if in the lease there is a
provision for re-entry and reletting at the tenant's expense, this provi-
sion will be valid and controlling.3 7
There are no cases that have discussed the issue of when the cause of
action for damages arises, but assuming the courts would follow the
rationale of the abandonment cases, they would undoubtedly hold that
damages do not accrue until the termination date provided for in
the lease.3 8
THE LAW AS OF JULY 1, 1971
Section 1951.2 of the New Legislation
Assembly Bill 1713' adds several sections to the Civil Code and the
Code of Civil Procedure and amends section 3308 of the Civil Code.
Civil Code section 1951.20 makes the most significant changes in the
previously existing law. Section 1951.2(a) cuts through the problems
of the current law relating to abandonment by the tenant and justifiable
eviction by the landlord and declares that in either instance, the lease
terminates, except where lease provisions authorizing the tenant to as-
sign or sublease his interest pursuant to new section 1951.4 are in-
corporated.4 1  The tenant has no further obligations except as pro-
vided in the remainder of section 1951.2. Section 1951.2(d) elimi-
34 The landlord may evict by use of an unlawful detainer if necessary. See
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174.
35 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1174 provides:
and if the proceedings be for an unlawful detainer after neglect, or failure to
perform the conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement under which
the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment shall
also declare the forfeiture of such lease or agreement if the notice required
by Section 1161 of the code states the election of the landlord to declare the
forfeiture thereof, but if such notice does not so state such election the lease
or agreement shall not be forfeited.
36 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1161 requires a three day notice for an unlawful
detainer action.
37 Lawrence Barker, Inc. v. Briggs, 39 Cal. 2d 654, 664 (1952). See also
Burke v. Norton, 42 Cal. App. 705 (1919).
38 Harvey, A Study to Determine Whether the Rights and Duties Attendant
Upon the Termination of a Lease Should be Revised, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1141, 1170
(1966).
39 A.B. 171; CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 89, introduced by Assemblyman James A.
Hayes, Republican, Long Beach, California.
40 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1951.2.
41 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2(a):
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nates any future uncertainty as to whether there has been a surren-
der by operation of law, since it specifically provides that any attempt
by the landlord to mitigate damages by reletting the premises to a
second tenant, for example, does not waive the landlord's right to a
judgment for damages. 42  Contrary to the common law, this section
permits the landlord to collect damages even though the lease has
been terminated. At common law, once the lease was terminated, all
rights to damages or rent subsequent to the termination were for-
feited; 43 and to prevent termination by operation of law, notice to the
tenant was required.44 The statute makes no mention of any notice re-
quirement to the breaching tenant in order to hold him liable for fu-
ture damages; however, since the lease is now terminated and because
damages are recoverable as a matter of law, there should be no
necessity for notice.
Section 1951.2(a)(1) allows recovery of the amount of unpaid rent
that was accumulated up to the termination of the lease.45  This pro-
vision merely codifies the common law which entitled the aggrieved
landlord to all unpaid rents which accrued prior to the ending of the
lease, even though the lease was terminated.46
Section 1951.2(a)(2) permits the landlord to collect the amount of
rent that would have been earned between the time of termination of
the lease and the day of judgment,47 less any amount which the tenant
proves could have been reasonably avoided by the landlord. In order
to be assured of collecting damages, the landlord must make reasonable
attempts to relet the premises. Should he be successful in rerenting,
he must obtain as high a rental as possible. If the landlord relets imme-
diately at a greater rental, he is not damaged, and the breaching tenant
is released from all obligations under the contract.
Finally, section 1951.2(a)(3) provides that the landlord may re-
cover the amount of rent that would fall due between the time of judg-
Except as otherwise provided in Section 1951.4, if a lessee of real property
breaches the lease and abandons the property before the end of the term or
if his right to possession is terminated by the lessor because of a breach of the
lease, the lease terminates.
42 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1951.2(d): "Efforts by the lessor to mitigate the damages
caused by the lessee's breach of the lease do not waive the lessor's right to recover
damages under this section."
43 See note 21 supra.
44 See note 24 supra.
45 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2(a)(1): "The worth at the time of award of the
unpaid rent which had been earned at the time of termination . .
46 See note 21 supra.
47 CAL. Crv. CODE § 1951.2(a) (2):
The worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent
which would have been earned after termination until the time of award ex-
ceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could have been
reasonably avoided. ...
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ment and the termination date set forth in the lease, less the amount
the tenant proves could be reasonably avoided. 48  This recovery may
occur at the time of judgment, provided that (1) the parties so stipu-
lated to acceleration in the lease, or (2) the landlord has relet the
premises.49 In the absence of (1) or (2) above, the landlord must
wait until the termination date stipulated in the lease before bringing
his cause of action because should he finalize his judgment prior to
the termination 0 date in the lease, his damages which would accrue
subsequent to the termination date would be forfeited. The land-
lord now has only one cause of action. Previously, the landlord was
permitted to bring a series of actions under the rationale that the lease
continued in existence. Since the lease now terminates as a matter of
law under Civil Code section 1951.2(a) only one action may be
maintained.
Thus section 1951.2(a)(3) does not entirely resolve the resulting
inequities under the common law approach (damages not accruing
until the end of the stipulated term of the lease) unless there has
been a reletting of the leasehold between the termination date and the
time of judgment or there is a damage acceleration clause in the lease.
As a practical matter, nearly all leases contain an acceleration clause
and therefore, in most instances, full recovery for all damages may be
obtained at the time of judgment regardless of whether there has been a
rerental.
Section 1951.2(a) (3), as originally introduced would have per-
mitted the landlord to recover at the time of judgment the amount of
damages which would have accrued subsequent to the date of judgment,
less the amount the tenant proves could be reasonably avoided.51 As
introduced, the section would have permitted the landlord to be fully
48 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2(a)(3):
Subject to subdivision (c), the worth at the time of award of the amount by
which the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of award
exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the lessee proves could be reason-
ably avoided ...
49 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1951.2(c)(1), (2):
The lessor may recover damages under paragraph (3) of subdivision (a)
only if: (1) The lease provides that the damages he may recover include the
worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the
balance of the term after the time of award, or for any shorter period of time
specified in the lease, exceeds the amount of such rental loss for the same pe-
riod that the lessee proves could be reasonably avoided; or (2) The lessor
relet the property prior to the time of award and proves that in reletting
the property he acted reasonably and in a good faith effort to mitigate
damages, but the recovery of damages under this paragraph is subject to any
limitations specified in the lease.
50 Note, however, there is a two year statute of limitations for an oral lease and
a four year statute of limitations for a written lease. See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§
337.2 and 339.5..
51 A.B. 171, as introduced January 14, 1970.
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compensated at the time of award, even if there had been no rerenting
or accelerated damages clause in the lease. 52
The more restrictive provision finally enacted was apparently the re-
sult of fear that the landlord could collect his judgment for the bal-
ance of the term and then immediately relet the leasehold at a tidy
profit." It would appear that the anticipation of an unjust enrich-
ment to the landlord was unfounded. If the landlord were in a posi-
tion where he could immediately rerent after the breach, but waits un-
til the day after judgment, it could most likely be shown by the de-
faulting tenant that the landlord was not reasonable in his attempt to
mitigate damages. Testimony of a reputable real estate broker could
be introduced to show that the landlord was unreasonable and was at-
tempting to commit a fraud upon the court. Such testimony if ac-
cepted by the trier of fact, would probably sustain the tenant's burden
of proof. Once the landlord was shown not to have been reasonable in
his efforts to rerent, his award would be reduced by an amount found
by the court to be a reasonable rerental value of the premises during the
period that it was permitted to remain unoccupied. 54  If the tenant,
upon his own initiative, were able to procure a satisfactory sub-tenant,
this substitute tenant would be sufficient proof that the landlord was
not acting reasonably.5
Conceivably this amendment could work against the tenant. One
can conjure two hypothetical situations where the outcome could
work to the tenant's detriment. First, consider the situation where the
tenant abandons a five-year leasehold after two years. The landlord
immediately relets for two years; thus leaving the last year's rental
not mitigated since the new lease is only for two of the remaining three
years. At the end of the third year the landlord brings suit for the
full five years. Is he entitled to the fifth year's rent even though his
damages are the amount of rent in the breached lease? If one con-
strues section 1951.2(a)(3)56 literally, the landlord should be en-
titled to the full five years rent. The section does not require the
landlord to relet for a period at least as great as the unexpired term
before he may collect for future rents. Second, assume the landlord, to
insure his ability to recover all damages at the time of judgment, relet
the premises to the first applicant, regardless of the difference in
52 Id.
53 Interview with James Reed, Legislative Assistant to Assemblyman Hayes.
54 Note that the section, as introduced, allowed the landlord his rents less the
amount the tenant could prove the landlord should have been able to save by obtaining
a subsequent tenant.
55 See the discussion of reasonableness infra.
56 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2(a) (3).
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rentals. If the new rent was less than that called for in the lease the
landlord would hope to obtain the difference as damages. The tenant
would have almost an insurmountable task of proving that the land-
lord's effort was not reasonable, lacking some evidence of collusion and
fraud.
Mitigation of Damages-Reasonableness
The majority view seems to be that the standard for the landlord's
efforts to mitigate damages is similar to that of the- proverbial reasonable
man in negligence cases.57 California apparently differs from this gen-
eral rule of reasonableness for mitigating damages. In a 1968 case,
the court stated the standard to be:
(Mitigation) does not require the injured party to take measures
which are unreasonable or impractical or which would involve
expenditures disproportionate to the loss sought to be avoided or
which may be beyond his financial means. . . The reason-
ableness . . . must be judged in the light of the situation con-
fronting him at the time the loss was threatened and not by the
judgment of hindsight . . . The fact that reasonable measures
other than the one taken would have avoided damage is not, in
and of itself, proof of the fact that the one taken, though un-
successful, was unreasonable. . . . The standard by which rea-
sonableness of the injured party's efforts is t6 be measured is not as
high as the standard required in other areas of law. . . . It is
sufficient if he acts reasonably and with due diligence, in good
faith. 58
The court in stating that "[t]he standard by which reasonableness
of the injured party's efforts is to be measured is not so high as the
standard required in other areas of law" cited McCormick on Damages"0
where it is stated:
the standard of due care in determining liability in tort for negli-
gence should be much stricter than the standard of reasonable-
ness in choice of expedients to reduce or avoid damages applied
against a person against whom a wrong has been committed. 0
Thus, by merely requiring due diligence (in good faith) the court
apparently has established a lesser standard for the reasonable man
who mitigates damages when compared to the reasonable man in negli-
gence cases. Regardless of the California position the question of
57 21 A.L.R. 3d 542.
58 Green v. Smith, 261 Cal. App. 2d 392 (1969).
59 Green v. Smith, 261 Cal. App. 2d 392, 397 (1969), citing with approval Mc-
CORMICK ON DAMAGES 134 (1935).60 McCoRmicK ON DAMAGES 134 (1935).
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reasonableness is for the trier of fact. 61 The trier of fact must ex-
amine all facts as they appeared to the landlord and then make a sub-
jective determination whether the landlord was reasonable.
Burden of Proof as to Reasonableness
The burden of proof as to the landlord's reasonableness in mitigation
of damages is on the breaching tenant.6 2  The one exception to this
requirement is when the landlord has relet and is attempting to collect
damages that would become due after judgment.6 3  In that case the
burden of proof is on the landlord to prove that he was reasonable.
Shifting this burden onto the landlord seems to be inequitable. Pre-
sumably in most cases, the tenant's conduct is responsible for the breach
but under this exception, the innocent landlord is charged with the
burden of establishing that his conduct was reasonable. Once the
landlord has relet, there should be a rebuttable presumption he was
reasonable. If the tenant is not satisfied with the landlord's efforts,
then the tenant should have the burden to show the landlord could
have done better.
Exception to the Requirement of Mitigation of Damages
Civil Code section 1951.4 provides that when the tenant unjustifi-
ably abandons the premises, the lease continues and the landlord may
collect the rent as it becomes due without attempting to mitigate
damages if the lease provides for the right on the part of the tenant to
sublease or assign.64 Generally the lease will contain standards and
conditions for subleasing which allow the landlord to use discretion in
61 Id. at 397.
62 Sections 1951.2(a)(2), (3), require the landlord to use reasonable efforts in
mitigating damages. They also place the burden of proof on the tenant.
63 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2(c) (2).
64 CAL. CrV. CODE § 1951.4:
(a) The remedy described in this section is available only if the lease pro-
vides for this remedy. (b) Even though a lessee of real property has
breached his lease and abandoned the property, the lease continues in effect
for so long as the lessor does not terminate the lessee's right to possession,
and the lessor may enforce all his rights and remedies under the lease, in-
cluding the right to recover the rent as it becomes due under the lease, if the
lease permits the lessee to do any of the following: (1) Sublet the property,
assign his interest in the lease, or both. (2) Sublet the property, assign his
interest in the lease, or both, subject to standards or conditions, and the lessor
does not require compliance with any unreasonable standard for, nor any
unreasonable condition on, such subletting or assignment. (3) Sublet the
property, assign his interest in the lease, or both, with the consent of the
lessor, and the lease provides that such consent shall not unreasonably be
withheld. (c) For the purposes of sub-division (b), the following do not
constitute a termination of the lessee's right to possession: (1) Acts of
maintenance or preservation of efforts to relet the property. (2) The ap-
pointment of a receiver upon initiative of the lessor to protect the lessor's
interest under the lease.
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accepting a subtenant or assignee. In the absence of such standards,
the previously enumerated tests of reasonableness would apply. This
Civil Code provision is most useful when:
[T]he lessor does not have the desire, facilities, or ability to man-
age the property and to acquire a suitable tenant and for this rea-
son desires to avoid the burden that Section 1951.2 places on the
lessor to mitigate the damages by reletting the property ...
(Also), a lessor could, in reliance on the lessee's rental obligation
under a long-term lease, construct an improvement to the specifi-
cations of the lessee for the use of the lessee during the lease term.
The remedy available under section 1951.4 retains the substance of
the former law and gives the lessor, in effect, security for the re-
payment of the cost of the improvement in those cases. 65
Section 1952(c)66 expressly states that the landlord is not entitled to
the benefits of this provision when he evicts the tenant unless the ten-
ant obtains relief from forfeiture pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1179.67 It would appear that the reasoning behind the in-
applicability of the above provision when the landlord evicts the tenant
is that eviction automatically terminates the lease.68 Once the lease is
terminated, the tenant has no leasehold interest which is capable of
being transferred.
Objection to Mitigation of Damages
In Wohl v. Yelen,6 9 the court set forth three objections to requir-
ing the landlord to mitigate damages when the tenant abandons or is
evicted from the premises, with cause, prior to the termination of the
lease. In order to determine the sufficiency of the future California
law one should analyze it in relation to the objections set out in Wohl.
The first objection put forth is that the landlord is forced to continu-
ally search for new tenants, 70 in order to mitigate his damages. One
can argue that any effort by an innocent landlord, even if it only
amounts to placing a "for rent" sign in the window, is too great a
burden. In fact, some courts have taken the position that a default-
65 Calif. Law Rev. Comm. Recommendation relating to Real Property Leases
157, 168, 169 (Nov. 1969).66 CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1952 (c).
67 CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1179 provides that the court may relieve a tenant
against forfeiture of a lease, and restore him to his former estate under certain condi-
tions.
68 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1951.2(a).
69 Wohl v. Yelen, 22 Ill. App. 2d 455, 161 N.E.2d 339 (1959). See also Groll,
Landlord-Tenant: The Duty to Mitigate Damages, 17 DEPAuL L. REv. 311 (1967-
68); Comment, The Landlords Duty to Mitigate by Accepting a Proffered Acceptable
Subtenant-Illinois and Missouri, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 532 (1965-66).
70 Wohl v. Yelen, 22 Ill. App. 455, 464, 161 N.E.2d 339, 343 (1959).
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ing tenant, by his own wrongdoing, should not be allowed to impose
any duty on the landlord.71 This approach appears to be unduly
harsh, since public policy favors rerenting. 72
The California law lessens the landlord's burden of mitigation in that
the statute permits the landlord to recover reasonable expenses incurred
in preparing the property for reletting.73 Further, the burden of proof
is placed on the tenant to show that the expenses incurred in prepara-
tion to the reletting by the landlord were unreasonable. By allowing
recovery for expenses incurred in reletting and shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant tenant, the court has palliated the severity to
the landlord, and it appears that there will be no objections to the
requirement that the landlord seek a new tenant.
The second objection in Wohl v. Yelen is that there might be an
unwilling acceptance of a surrender (by the landlord) due to a sur-
render by operation of law.74 California disposes of this objection
by now providing that no attempt to mitigate damages may constitute
an acceptance of a proffered surrender.
The third and final objection made is -that mitigation might cause
the landlord to accept someone else in what was a personal rela-
tionship.76  Some lease interests will undoubtedly be based on im-
portant personal relationships between the landlord and tenant; how-
ever, these generally will be for reasons other than business or com-
mercial use and therefore would not be as likely to result in litigation
under these code sections. Though business and commercial leases
are at times initiated as a result of a personal relation between the
landlord and the tenant in today's modem world the overwhelming
majority of leases are made without regard to a personal relationship. 71
A problem related to the personal relationship argument is the de-
termination of suitability of a prospective subtenant. The general rule
is that a landlord should not be forced to rent to a substitute tenant
who would put the premises to a different use.78
[N]or is the landlord obligated to alter or increase his obligations
(e.g., extending the length of the lease term) in order to secure a
71 21 A.L.R.3d 539, and the cases collected therein.
72 Id. at 540.
73 These expenses are impliedly recoverable by reason of § 1951.2(a)(4) which
allows recovery for any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the
detriment proximately caused by the tenant's breach.
74 Wohl v. Yelen, 22 Ill. App. 2d 455, 464, 161 N.E.2d 339, 343 (1959).
75 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2(d).
76 See note 74 supra.
77 Comment, The Landlords Duty to Mitigate by Accepting Sub-Tenant-Illi-
nois and Missouri, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 532, 536 (1965-66).
78 Groll, Landlord-Tenant: The Duty to Mitigate Damages, 17 DEPAUL L. REV.
311, 319 (1967-68).
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replacement tenant 79
Where there is a question of suitability, the subtenant's credit, past
performance, and general business reputation, as well as the pro-
posed use and the mechanics thereof, are several factors which
might be used to weigh subtenant acceptability. One factor may
be determinative in one case and meaningless in another.80
The suitability of a subtenant is most likely to create difficulties
when the leasehold is one requiring special abilities and equipment or
usage of available equipment. For example, if the leasehold is a busi-
ness office, there should be little or no difficulty in obtaining a re-
placement tenant. On the other hand, if the premises were altered for
use by an arc-welder, it may be extremely difficult to obtain a suitable
replacement. Since the majority of leaseholds are merely office space or
apartment houses, this objection does not appear to present a problem
of such significance to warrant invalidating the law and disposing of
the necessity for mitigating damages.
Effect of Other Sections of the New Legislation
Additional observations concerning the effect of this new legislation.
must be made at this juncture. Section 1951.2(a)(4) allows recovery
of any other damages which are proximately caused.8' This section
'allows the landlord to recover for such sundry items as physical dam-
age to the premises, expenses in retaking, making repairs, reletting the
premises and any other damages necessary to make him whole, subject
to the landlord's proving they were directly the result of the breach and
not caused by some extraneous force.
Further, there is nothing in section 1951.2 which effects the grounds
justifying the landlord's eviction of the tenant.82 Also section 1951.2
does not affect the offsetting claim a defaulting tenant may have
against the landlord, should the landlord fail to meet all of his obliga-
tions.83
A question also arises as to whether a landlord may obtain specific
performance of a lease. Section 1951.88" provides that section
79 Id. Footnotes omitted.
80 Comment, The Landlords Duly to Mitigate by Accepting a Proffered Accept-
able Sub-tenant-Illinois and Missouri, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 532, 539 (1959).
81 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1951.2(a)(4):
Any other amount necessary to compensate the lessor for all the detriment
proximately caused by the lessee's failure to perform his obligations under the
lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result
therefrom.
82 For these grounds see 2 WrN, SummAY OF CALFORNA LAW, Real Property
§§ 276-278 (1960).
83 California Law Revision Commission Recommendation relating to Real Prop-
erty Leases 164 (Nov. 1969).
84 CAL. CIV. CODF § 1951.8.
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1951.288 does not bar equitable relief where it is appropriate; there-
fore, specific performance depends upon satisfying the traditional equi-
table requirements of an inadequate remedy at law.
Finally section 1951.5 provides that Civil Code sections 1670 and
1671 which pertain to liquidated damages apply to a lease of real
property.
The amount of the lessor's damages may be difficult to determine
in some cases since the lessor's right to damages accrues at the time
of the breach and abandonment or when the lease is terminated
by the lessor. . . . This difficulty may be avoided in appropriate
cases by a liquidated damage provision . . . . Under former
law, provisions in real property leases for liquidated damages
upon breach by the lessee were held to be void . . . . However,
such holdings were based on the former rule that the lessor's cause
of action upon breach of the lease and abandonment of the prop-
erty or upon termination of the lessee's right to possession was ei-
ther for the rent as it became due or for the rental deficiency at
the end of the lease term. So far as provisions for liquidated dam-
ages upon a lessor's breach are concerned, such provisions were
upheld under the preexisting law if reasonable. . . . Nothing in
Section 1951.5 changes this rule.86
SUMMARY
There should be no difficulty in implementing the recent legislation.
Section 1952.2 of the Civil Code provides that none of the require-
ments in sections 1951 to 1952 apply to any lease executed before
July 1, 1971, or "[a]ny lease executed on or after July 1, 1971, if the
terms of the lease were fixed by a lease, option, or other agreement
executed before July 1, 1971 ."7
Possibly the most important factor will be the situation where the
landlord desires to keep the lease in effect pursuant to section 1951.4.
The landlord must allow the tenant to sublet or assign his interest in
the lease, and must not impose any unreasonable standards or condi-
tions upon the tenant regarding letting or assigning the lease.88
In order to collect future damages when suing for a breach of the
lease, a clause stipulating to future damages in case of a breach
should be included in the lease.89 This clause would be similar to the
8r CAL. CIv. CODE § 1951,2.
86 Calif. Law Rev. Comm. Recommendation relating to Real Property Leases 157,
170 (Nov. 1969), citations omitted.
87 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1952.2(a) (b).
88 Cosksan, Recovery Based on Future Rent After Lessee's Breach, 44 L.A.
BAR BULL. 199, 228 (1968-69).
89 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1951.2(c)(1).
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clause now utilized in most leases pursuant to Civil Code section 3308.
Civil Code section 3308, as amended, does not apply to a lease of
real property unless the lease was executed before July 1, 1971 or its
terms were fixed by any agreement executed before July 1, 1971.
Under section 1951.2(a)(4) the landlord will be allowed to recover
damages for all detriment proximately caused by the tenant's breach.
Careful drafting will require inclusion and exclusion of specific factors
which may be the cause of disagreement should the tenant breach."
The new legislation appears to be easily adaptable to modem
leases. Requiring the landlord to mitigate damages when a tenant
breaches is a desirable result that should have been in effect long ago.
David W. Robison
90 Cosksan, supra note 88, at 228.
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